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Abstract: Traditionally, social entities (i.e., social properties, facts, kinds, groups, institutions, 
and structures) have not fallen within the purview of mainstream metaphysics. In this chapter, we 
consider whether the exclusion of social entities from mainstream metaphysics is philosophically 
warranted or if it instead rests on historical accident or bias. We examine three ways one might 
attempt to justify excluding social metaphysics from the domain of metaphysical inquiry and 
argue that each ​fails. Thus, we conclude that social entities are not justifiably excluded from 
metaphysical inquiry. Finally, we ask how focusing on social entities could change the character 
of metaphysical inquiry. We suggest ​that starting from examples of social entities might lead 
metaphysicians to rethink the assumption that describing reality in terms of intrinsic, 
independent, and individualistic features is preferable to describing it in terms of relational, 
dependent, and non-individualistic features. 
 
Traditionally, social entities have not fallen within the purview of mainstream metaphysics. For             
example, very few original research articles on social metaphysics have been published in top              
philosophy journals. Moreover, only one metaphysics textbook includes social metaphysics as a            
1
topic. This is particularly striking in view of the fact that there has been work on social ontology                  
2
for decades. Here, in addition to surveying the field of social ontology, we consider whether the                
3
1 This claim is easily verified by searching keywords such as “social,” “social kind,” “social 
group,” etc.,  top philosophy journals (e.g., ​Philosophical Review, the Journal of Philosophy, 
Mind, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Nous, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 
Philosophical Studies​, etc.). 
2 For example, see Carroll and Markosian 2010; Conee and Sider 2014; Crane and Farkas 2004; 
Effingham 2013; Kim, Korman, and Sosa 2011; Koons and Pickavance 2015, 2017; Loux and 
Crisp 2017; Loux 2008; Lowe 2002; Mumford 2012; Sider, Hawthorne, Zimmerman 2007; 
Tahko 2016; van Inwagen 2014; van Inwagen and Zimmerman 2008. Most of these titles were 
published well after the inception of social metaphysics in analytic philosophy. NB: Ney’s (2014) 
introductory metaphysics textbook includes a chapter on the metaphysics of race. 
3 For instance, Ruben 1985; Gilbert 1989; Tuomela 1989; and Searle 1990, 1995, 2010; Hacking 
1996, 1999; Haslanger 1995; Burman (Andersson) 2007, in addition to more than 30 years of 
work on the metaphysics of race and gender (e.g., Appiah 1985). Other work on collective 
1 
exclusion of social entities from mainstream metaphysics is philosophically warranted or if it             
instead rests on historical accident or bias.  
 
We examine three ways one might attempt to justify excluding social metaphysics from the              
domain of metaphysical inquiry. Metaphysical inquiry, as we construe it, includes both first-order             
metaphysics and metametaphysical questions about the nature of metaphysics. Given this           
construal, we argue that each of the arguments fails and conclude that the exclusion of social                
entities, properties, kinds, and facts from mainstream metaphysics is unjustified. Further, we            
show that broadening the scope of metaphysics to include a focus on the social requires us to                 
rethink some commonplace metaphysical assumptions. 
 
The article is structured as follows. ​In sections ​I-III​, we outline arguments from the literature that                
might be used to provide justification for the view that metaphysics need not focus on social                
entities. With respect to each argument, we show that it fails to justify the exclusion of social                 
entities from metaphysical inquiry. In ​I ​we consider whether eliminativism or reductionism about             
social entities is true. If either is true, one might think that metaphysics ought not focus on the                  
social, for there are no (irreducible) social entities on which to focus. In ​II ​we consider whether                 
metaphysics ought to focus exclusively on fundamental entities. Since social entities are plausibly             
not fundamental, this could be used to justify the exclusion of social entities. In ​III ​we consider                 
the view that metaphysics should focus on natural kinds. Finally, in ​IV​, we consider what               
metaphysical inquiry that includes social entities as central examples would look like. We gesture              
towards the view that starting from examples of social entities leads us to rethink the assumption                
that describing reality in terms of intrinsic, independent, and individualistic features is preferable             
to describing it in terms of relational, dependent, and non-individualistic features. 
 
Before turning to our main arguments, we outline two general ways social entities might depend               
on social factors and set out a range of examples of social entities. Social entities might depend                 
on social factors causally or constitutively. The following theses (adapted from definitions of             
forms of social construction from Haslanger 2003 and Mallon 2014) give a feel for the difference: 
 
Causal Dependence​: X (being F) is ​causally dependent on social factors if and only if               
social factors (partially) cause X to exist (as F).  
 
Constitutive Dependence​: X (being F) ​constitutively depends on social factors just in case             
(i) in defining what it is to be X (or for X to be F) reference must be made to some social                      
intentionality also focuses in part on social ontology. See Schweikard and Schmid 2013 for an 
overview. 
2 
factors or (ii) social factors are metaphysically necessary for X to exist (as an F) or (iii)                 
social factors ground the existence of X (or the fact that X is F).  
4
 
An entity might causally depend on social factors like human behavior, practices, beliefs, and so               
on without constitutively depending on social factors. For instance, compounds that are            
synthesized in a chemistry lab are causally dependent on social practices. Yet, such compounds              
are plausibly not constitutively dependent on social factors. That is, they are definable without              
reference to social factors, social factors are not metaphysically necessary for the compound to              
exist, and the existence of the compound is not grounded in social factors. In contrast,               
universities, gender, and inflation might be both causally and constitutively dependent on social             
factors.  
 
When we use “social entity” we intend for it to be broadly construed so as to include entities of                   
the following sorts: 
 
Social properties and relations (e.g., being married, being a U.S. citizen, being a             
manager, having more buying power than); 
Social facts (e.g., that the Supreme Court exists, that Kai has four hundred dollars in her                
bank account, that the United States has a larger military than Gambia); 
Social kinds (e.g., money and marriage, war and women, capitalists and cartels, races,             
recessions, and refugees); 
Social groups (e.g., racial and gender groups, the Minnesota Twins, the Supreme Court,             
Migos); 
Social institutions​ (e.g., universities, corporations); 
Social structures (e.g., capitalist power structures, oppressive gender structures, the          
structure of the U.S. government). 
 
In what follows, we note when arguments apply to some and not other social entities. 
 
I. Eliminativism and Reduction 
 
Our world appears to include primates, pears, and paper, trees, telephones, and tapirs. It also               
seems to include ethnic groups, parliaments, nations, bands, and sports teams. Common sense and              
our everyday experiences seem to confirm that there are social entities. Are appearances             
misleading? That is, are there any social entities?  
 
4 ​There are various ways one can spell out constitutive dependence. We do not wish to take a 
stand on the issue here, hence the disjunctive definition. For discussion of various ways social 
entities might be “held together” see Epstein (2015).  
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Eliminativists about Fs hold that there are no Fs. Eliminativism about social entities has been               
argued for in three main ways. First, one might be motivated to reject social entities given social                 
analogs to puzzles about composition (e.g., Sorites paradoxes, Ship of Theseus puzzles, the             
puzzle of the statue and the clay). If one is inclined to hold that ships, cups, and dogs do not exist                     
due to these puzzles, one might be similarly inclined to argue that social groups and at least some                  
other social entities do not exist (van Inwagen 1990; Unger 1980).  
 
However, many philosophers reject drawing nihilist or eliminativist conclusions from these           
puzzles. For instance, some argue that puzzles about composition motivate accepting           
mereological universalism (Lewis 1991; Sider 2001). Others argue that the puzzles can be solved              
while maintaining a restricted, “common sense” ontological view (Korman 2015; Markosian           
1998, 2008). Whichever view one is inclined to adopt in the realm of non-social material objects                
one will plausibly be inclined to adopt for material social entities as well.  
 
Second, one might hold eliminativist views about specific social entities. Some argue that there              
are no racial groups because there are no biological racial essences (Appiah 1996; Zack 1993,               
2002). For instance, Appiah argues that there are not racial groups whose members share              
“fundamental, heritable, physical, moral, intellectual, and cultural characteristics with one          
another” (1996, 54). He argues that the existence of races relies on there being biological racial                
essences. Thus, the lack of shared, biological racial essences entails that there are no races.               
Similar arguments might be posed for gender, ethnic, sexuality, and other sorts of social groups.  
 
The second eliminativist argument is also widely disputed. Many argue that racial, gender, and              
other groups exist, but maintain that the existence of such groups does not rely on there being                 
shared, biological essences. On some views concepts for social kinds are taken to be cluster               
concepts, so that there need not be ​an ​essence to a kind (Stoljar 1995, 2011; Outlaw 1996; Hale                  
1996; Corvino 2000; Heyes 2000). ​Much of the work on social construction in philosophy              
involves arguing that there are social kinds, but they are dependent on social practices not on                
shared biological essences (Alcoff 2006; Blum 2010; Diaz-Leon 2015a, 2015b; Haslanger 2000,            
2003, 2012; Jeffers 2013; Mallon 2006, 2016; Mills 1997, 1998; Sundstrom 2002; Taylor 2004).              
For instance, Blum argues that “racialized groups are characterized by forms of experience they              
have undergone and a sociohistorical identity that they possess ​because of ​the false attributions to               
them … of innate biobehavioral tendencies” (2010, 300). Similarly, Haslanger argues that a view              
of gender groups should acknowledge “the causal impact of classification” (2003, 315).            
Hacking’s (1996, 1999) notion of looping effects on human kinds is one way to understand the                
effect of classification. He takes classifying to potentially elicit changes in behavior and             
self-conception thereby modifying the nature of the kind which leads to another “loop” which can               
elicit further behavioral changes.  
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Moreover, it is possible that although racial, gender, and other social groups do not have shared,                
biological essences, they have shared, non-biological essences (Witt 1995, 2011a, 2011b).           
Charlotte Witt argues that we should not conflate essentialism with biologisim because biological             
descriptions are only one way of specifying the essence of these groups. Further, she argues that                
social construction is compatible with essentialism (1995). It follows that by demonstrating that             
social groups are not unified by shared, biological essences one does not thereby demonstrate that               
those groups do not exist. 
 
Third, individualists in the social sciences (Weber 1922/2013; Hayek 1955; Popper 1966) have             
argued that social entities are not required for explanation and that there are no irreducible social                
entities. Explanatory or methodological individualists hold that explanations can be given solely            
in terms of individuals and their actions rather than “spooky” social forces. Ontological             
individualists argue that there are no irreducible social entities.  
 
Arguments relying on ontological and methodological individualism are distinct from the other            
eliminativist arguments we considered because they potentially eliminate ​all social entities. In            
contrast, arguments based on puzzles of composition apply only to material social objects (e.g.,              
groups). They do not apply, for instance, to social facts or properties. Arguments based on               5
essentialism apply only to racial, gender, and other social kinds that are the locus of oppression                
and possible sites for social justice projects. However, an explanatory individualist aims to show              
that all social entities including social facts, properties, and so on are explanatorily superfluous.              
An ontological individualist might argue that there are no social entities whatsoever.   
6
 
In their strongest forms, both individualist theses rely on reduction. On a reductive view about               7
Fs, there are Fs, but they are nothing “over and above” some other things G. For instance,                 
according to identity theory in philosophy of mind there are mental states, but they just are brain                 
states (i.e., they are identical to brain states). According to individualists, social facts or other               
social entities are nothing over an above non-social facts or entities.  
 
The success of explanatory individualism relies on the reduction of social facts to non-social              
facts. ​The success of ontological individualism, which need not be paired with explanatory             
individualism, requires that all purported social entities can be successfully reduced to            
individuals. ​Ruben (1985) considers various non-social reduction bases for nations and finds each             
wanting. Epstein (2009, 2015) argues that even a weaker version of individualism relying on              
5 This is because arrangements of simples could instantiate social properties and thereby ground 
social facts. For instance, atoms arranged shell-wise could have the property of being money and 
this could ground the truth of the social fact that atoms arranged shell-wise are money. 
6 See Greenwood (2003) and Epstein (2015) for discussion of forms of individualism and social 
explanation.  
7 ​A weaker version of either thesis might rely on supervenience.  
5 
supervenience rather than reduction fails. He cites cases of supervenience failing for certain social              
groups.  
 
Note further that a noncircular definition of ‘social’ appears to be required if individualist theses               
are to get off the ground. We will not canvass an array of definitions of ‘social’ that could be                   
offered, but a successful definition will need to be broad enough to capture the range of social                 
entities like those listed above, as well as social beliefs, actions, habits, desires, and so on. 
 
Several philosophers have expressed skepticism about drawing a sharp distinction between social            
and non-social individualistic facts. For instance, ​Haslanger holds that the possibility of giving a              
non-circular definition of ‘social’ is unlikely (2016, fn 8). Similarly, ​Epstein ​(2015, 102) states              
that he is “not confident” that a clear distinction can be drawn. He notes that individualism is                 
viable only if there is a clear distinction “[o]therwise, it is pointless for [an individualist] to assert                 
that the social facts are exhaustively “built out of” the individualistic ones” (ibid.). If no sharp                
distinction can be drawn, the potential for the success of individualism is undermined. 
 
While we have offered criticisms against eliminativist and reductionist strategies, notice that if a              
reductionist argument is successful, the exclusion of social metaphysics from metaphysical           
inquiry is not warranted. For instance, suppose social entities are identical to some non-social              
entities (i.e., a social version of identity theory is true). On this view, social entities are still part                  
of metaphysics. The claim is that they are identical to non-social entities, not that they fail to                 
exist. Further, even if one posits that certain social kinds do not exist, that does not mean that                  
questions about ​whether they exist fall outside of metaphysical inquiry. For instance, the view              
that there are no racial groups is a metaphysical view. In engaging in metaontological or               
metametaphysical inquiry about what exists, one is engaged in ontological and metaphysical            
inquiry. So, if one wants to argue for eliminativism about social entities one is doing both                
metaphysics and social ontology. Eliminativism does not provide a reason to exclude questions of              
social ontology from broader metaphysical inquiry, even if ultimately one wants to argue that              
there are no social entities.  
 
While ontological questions about the existence of certain sorts of entities have been common in               
metaphysics, they have fallen somewhat out of favor in contemporary metaphysics, which favors             
asking questions about fundamentality, grounding, and dependence, rather than existence. Thus,           
we next consider views according to which Fs exist but are not fundamental or independent. We                
consider these views next.  
 
II. Fundamentality and Mind-Dependence 
  
Another reason for excluding social entities from metaphysics is the view that metaphysics is or               
should be solely concerned with entities that are metaphysically fundamental. For example, one             
6 
might characterize metaphysics as the study of the ​fundamental structure of reality (Sider 2011).              8
If metaphysics is the study of the fundamental structure of reality, and social entities are not                
fundamental, then they have been excluded from metaphysical inquiry for good reason. There are,              
however, several problems with this line of argument.  
 
First, many traditional metaphysical disputes are about ​whether some phenomenon is           
fundamental (Bennett 2017, 232). If metaphysics is only concerned with fundamentalia, then the             
question of whether these debates have a metaphysical subject matter depends on who is correct               
about the fundamentality of the entities in question. This is extremely counterintuitive. For             
example, consider the question of whether grounding is a fundamental relation. It is not the case                
that grounding falls within the domain metaphysical inquiry only if the answer to this question is                
yes! The dispute itself is metaphysical either way. To put the point another way, when engaged in                 
metametaphysics about the features of the entities in one’s ontology or the nature of a particular                
entity one is engaged in metaphysics. 
 
However, let’s set that consideration aside for the moment. Instead, suppose that the             
aforementioned characterization of metaphysics is correct. That is, suppose that metaphysics is            
the study of the fundamental structure of reality. It does not immediately follow that social               
entities can be excluded from the domain of metaphysics on these grounds because it is possible                
that social entities ​are metaphysically fundamental. That is, if metaphysics is the study of the               
fundamental structure of reality, but social entities turn out to be fundamental, then social entities               
are a proper topic of metaphysical investigation.  
 
To illustrate this possibility we consider two views according to which social entities can be               
fundamental. First, Barnes (2012) develops a view of ontological emergence according to which             
emergent entities are those that are dependent, but fundamental. While this view of emergence is               
controversial, it demonstrates the possibility that social entities are fundamental even though they             
are dependent. Barnes applies her characterization of ontological emergence to debates about            
minds, living beings and persons, composite objects in gunky ontologies, tropes, and certain             
quantum phenomena (e.g., quantum entanglement). However, she indicates that entities and           
phenomena other than these could be characterized as ontologically emergent in ways that are              
both unmysterious and theoretically useful. Indeed, elsewhere Barnes suggests that one way of             
understanding Haslanger’s constructionist account of social structures is that some of their            
properties are emergent (Barnes 2017, 2424). On an emergentist interpretation of Haslanger’s            
view, certain properties of social structures emerge from, and depend on, our thoughts and              
8 Trenton Merricks (2013) expresses skepticism about Sider’s claim that this is what metaphysics 
is about: “metaphysics is not – not even ‘at bottom’ – about only one thing, and so not – not even 
‘at bottom’ – about only the fundamental structure of reality” (722). Elizabeth Barnes (2014, 
2017) argues against the fundamentalist conception of metaphysics on the grounds that it 
illegitimately rules out feminist metaphysics. Sider responds to the worry in his (2017).  
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practices. That is, they are constructed from complex patterns of social interaction—but the             
structures themselves are ontologically fundamental.  
 
Second, Sara Bernstein (forthcoming) argues that “middleism” (the thesis that some middle level             
is fundamental), is at least as plausible as “topism” (the thesis that top-most level is fundamental,                
e.g., the cosmos) and “bottomism” (the thesis that the bottom-most level is fundamental, e.g.,              
mereological atoms). She develops middleism with respect to middle-sized dry goods, but notes             
that her arguments apply ​mutatis mutandis to any entities which do not inhabit the top-most or                
bottom-most level. Since social entities occupy neither the top-most or the bottom-most level,             
then, according to middleism, they are candidates for being fundamental. If either Barnes’s or              
Bernstein’s views are viable, then social entities fall within the purview of metaphysics even              
when it is defined as the study of the fundamental structure of reality. 
 
Nevertheless, there are other reasons why we should reject the idea that metaphysics is the study                
of the fundamental structure of reality. First, suppose that priority monism is true. In that case, the                 
only fundamental entity is the entire cosmos (Schaffer 2010). It would not follow that the cosmos                
in its entirety is the only proper subject of metaphysical investigation. Presumably, there would              
still be a wide variety of phenomena for metaphysicians to investigate other than this maximally               
inclusive whole—namely, its proper parts, and their relationships to each other and the whole.  
 
Second, it is at least epistemically possible that there are no entities that are metaphysically               
fundamental. That is, it’s possible that there are no fundamentalia (Lewis 1991, Sider 1993,              
Schaffer 2003). If metaphysics is the study of the fundamental structure of reality, and there are                
no fundamentalia, then metaphysics lacks a subject matter. But presumably the discovery that             
reality lacks a fundamental structure would not thereby eliminate the subject matter of             
metaphysics. Karen Bennett puts the point vividly: if it turns out that there are no fundamentalia                
“metaphysicians will certainly take notice—but they will not ​give notice, and resign their jobs”              
(2017, 231). Thus, metaphysics should not be characterized as the study of the fundamental              
structure of reality. 
 
Furthermore, it is plain that metaphysics is ​not solely concerned with entities that are              
metaphysically fundamental. Many traditional metaphysical questions obviously concern        
nonfundamentalia. For example: Do persons have free will? What is the relationship between a              
statue and the lump of clay that constitutes it? Are biological species individuals or kinds? Are                
mental states identical to physical states of the brain? These questions concern entities that are on                
many accounts nonfundamental, i.e., persons, statues, biological species, and mental states. If            
metaphysics actually answers questions about nonfundamental entities then metaphysics does not           
exclusively concern the fundamental structure of reality.  
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Moreover, there are various alternative conceptions of metaphysics on offer that include social             
entities. For example, building on a tradition going back to Aristotle, Jonathan Schaffer argues              
“metaphysics is about what grounds what” (2009, 347). On his view, grounded—that is,             
nonfundamental—entities are not outside of the metaphysical domain. Similarly, Bennett argues           
that “the proper topic of metaphysics is the fundamental structure of reality, whether there are               
any less fundamental entities, how they are built from the fundamental, ​and at least some of those                 
nonfundamental entities themselves” (2017, 2014). On both of these views of metaphysics, social             
entities do not fall outside of the metaphysical domain.  
 
A related reason for excluding social entities from the domain of metaphysics rests on the view                
that metaphysics should be concerned with describing the mind-independent nature of reality.            
According to this proposal, the subject matter of metaphysics does not exclude all dependent              
entities; rather, it excludes only those that depend on our mental states in particular. Plausibly, all                
social entities are mind-dependent. Therefore, on this proposal, metaphysics does not include            
them.  
 
However, we argue that there are problems with this characterization of metaphysics as well.              
Mental states are mind dependent. According to intuitionists (e.g., Brouwer 1981), mathematical            
entities are too. Yet, inquiry into these entities clearly falls within the domain of metaphysics.               
Furthermore, secondary qualities and response-dependent properties are mind-dependent, but are          
likewise proper subjects of metaphysical inquiry.  
 
We conclude that social entities cannot be justifiably excluded from metaphysics because they             
fail to be fundamental. First, it is possible that social entities are fundamental. Second, and more                
importantly, it is not the case that metaphysics is merely the study of the fundamental structure of                 
reality. Traditionally, metaphysicians have investigated both fundamental and nonfundamental         
entities. Moreover, the question of whether some entities are fundamental is a properly             
metaphysical one. Finally, we argued that social entities cannot be justifiably excluded on the              
basis of being mind-dependent. Metaphysicians have long been concerned to investigate           
mind-dependent entities. In the next section, we consider whether social entities can be justifiably              
excluded because they fail to be natural. 
 
III. Naturalness  
 
So far we have argued that social entities cannot be excluded from the domain of metaphysics on                 
the grounds that they are not fundamental or mind-independent. Eliminativism and reductionism            
about social entities also fail to justify the exclusion of social ontology from metaphysical              
inquiry. In this section, we consider whether social entities can be justifiably excluded because              
they fail to be ​natural in some sense (Thomasson 2003, Khalidi 2015). We argue that this strategy                 
also fails to justify the exclusion of social entities from the domain of metaphysics. 
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A naturalistically inclined philosopher might argue that social entities are not legitimate subjects             
of metaphysical inquiry because metaphysicians should be concerned with investigating all and            
only those entities to which our best-confirmed scientific theories are ontologically committed            
(Quine 1969, Putnam 1972, Colyvan 2001). On this view, the question of whether social entities               
fall within the purview of metaphysics turns on the question of which scientific theories are best                
confirmed. Now, if physics is the only scientific theory which passes muster, then this would give                
us a reason to exclude social entities from metaphysical inquiry. However, if social scientific              
theories are sufficiently well-confirmed, then metaphysicians should be concerned with social           
entities after all. This is because social scientists clearly theorize about them. For example,              
economists, sociologists, and anthropologists theorize about social entities such as money and            
refugees.  
 
However, even if social scientific theories are sufficiently well-confirmed, and even if they are              
about social entities, there is reason to believe that we should not delimit metaphysics in this way.                 
There is no well-confirmed scientific theory that is ontologically committed to the existence of              
God, and yet whether God exists is a metaphysical question if there ever was one. More                
generally, metaphysicians ought to be engaged in the project of determining which entities exist,              
whether or not the best-confirmed scientific theories are committed to them. 
 
Yet another way to exclude social entities from metaphysics is by arguing that metaphysicians              
should restrict their attention to natural kinds. If social kinds fail to be natural kinds, then perhaps                 9
metaphysicians should not be concerned with them. We think that this proposal likewise fails to               
justifiably exclude social entities for two reasons.  
 
First, this strategy only purports to exclude social ​kinds from metaphysical theorizing, and not              
other social entities (e.g., social groups, social facts, or social events). Moreover, a clear contrast               
between social and natural kinds is difficult to draw. It is obvious that social kinds are not found                  
“in nature” so to speak. However, many paradigmatically natural kinds are not found “in nature”               
either, e.g., synthetically produced chemical compounds like polyethylene and PTFE (Teflon). 
 
Furthermore, social kinds do not contrast with natural kinds in the sense that the former are                
super​natural. Social kinds, like the human beings who create them, are occupants of the natural               
world, and are subject to the same physical laws that govern the behavior of everything from                
planets to protons. Moreover, social kinds are susceptible to empirical investigation. Indeed,            10
9 ​Another way of developing this objection is by appeal to perfectly natural properties (Dorr and 
Hawthorne 2013; Schaffer 2004; Lewis 1983).  
10 It is a separate question whether social kinds figure in laws of nature ​qua​ social kinds, or 
whether all social scientific laws are reducible to physical laws.  
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they form the subject matter of a wide-variety of scientific disciplines including sociology,             
anthropology, history, economics, and psychology. 
 
Finally, if natural kinds are just those kinds which enable us to successfully predict and explain                
empirical phenomena (that is, if natural kinds are those kinds that license inductive inferences,              
warrant empirical generalizations, and feature in fruitful explanations), there is reason to believe             
that social kinds are natural in the relevant sense (Bach 2012; Boyd 1999; Griffiths 1999; Khalidi                
2013, 2015, 2018; Mallon 2003, 2016; Mason 2016). For example, Ron Mallon argues that social               
constructionist explanations are a species of causal explanation. On his view, social roles like              
being a stay-at-home father or being a CEO are loci of predictive and explanatory potential. For                
instance, the fact that individuals occupy these roles enables us to predict and explain many of the                 
properties they instantiate.  
 
We conclude that social entities should not be excluded from metaphysics on the grounds that               
they fail to be natural in any of the aforementioned ways. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
We have argued that there is no good reason to think that social entities do not fall within the                   
purview of metaphysics. In particular, they cannot be excluded on the basis of being              
nonfundamental, mind-dependent, nonnatural, or reducible. And even if there are not social            
entities, it is still an metaphysical question which falls within general metaphysical inquiry             
whether certain social entities exist.  
 
Some topics in social metaphysics lie at the intersection of metaphysics and other areas of               
philosophy, for example political philosophy, feminist philosophy, or ethics (e.g., the metaphysics            
of race, and gender). But, as Bennett puts it, “lying at the intersection of A and B does not mean                    
lying in neither A nor B, but in both” (2017, 233). Moreover, philosophers have more permissive                
attitudes with respect to other metaphysical intersections. For example, many questions           
concerning the nature of mental phenomena fall at the intersection of metaphysics and philosophy              
of mind. Indeed, many questions lie at the intersection of metaphysics and empirical disciplines              
like chemistry and physics. But no one seriously thinks that these questions ​really belong to               
solely to these other disciplines, and not to metaphysics. For instance, many metaphysicians hold              
naturalistic views informed by and intersecting with various scientific disciplines ​(Ladyman and            
Ross 2007; Ney and Albert 2013).  
 
Our view is that the exclusion of social entities from metaphysics has more to do with the                 
interests and preoccupations of metaphysicians than the unsuitability of social entities themselves.            
Once these are taken account, we hold that there is no compelling philosophical reason, for               
example, why metaphysics should include an investigation of the existence and nature of holes              
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and time but not corporations and races. It is just that most metaphysicians, for whatever reason,                
have been more interested in investigating the former than latter. 
 
By way of concluding, we would like to consider what attending to social metaphysics means for                
the nature of metaphysics. In particular, we consider to what extent our metaphysical intuitions              
have been conditioned by a historically contingent focus on certain types of entities (e.g.,              
fundamentalia), to the exclusion of others (e.g., social groups). What would our metaphysical             
commitments be like if metaphysicians focused on social entities rather than the more traditional              
targets of metaphysical inquiry? 
 
First, focusing on social entities indicates that the metaphysician’s preference for describing            
reality in terms of features that are independent, individualistic, intrinsic, universal, ahistorical,            
and non-normative is not well founded. The preference for describing reality in terms of these               
features is bound up with the sorts of metaphysical commitments addressed in the previous              
sections of this paper. If one has a radically eliminativist ontology, or if one endorses a                
fundamentalist conception of metaphysics according to which metaphysics is ​really about           
describing the fundamental structure of reality, which consists exclusively of simples or            
spacetime points, then perhaps there is good reason to prefer a characterization of reality              
exclusively in terms of these features. But we have argued that metaphysics should not be               
characterized in these ways and that plenty of plainly metaphysical subjects cannot be so              
characterized. Today metaphysics has a greater focus on dependence or “building” relations or on              
“what grounds what.” Social metaphysics highlights the importance of dependent and relational            
features of reality, positioning it squarely within contemporary metaphysics.  
 
Social metaphysics leads us to describe reality in ways that are dependent, anti-individualistic,             
relational, particular, historical, and normatively-laden. For instance, many social entities are           
spatiotemporally restricted, and so are neither ahistorical nor universal. It is plausible that races              
and genders came into existence at a particular period in time, and may be found only in the small                   
corner of the universe inhabited by human beings. On some views they are historical or               
sociohistorical kinds (Bach 2012; Du Bois 1897/1996; Mallon 2016, 2003; Diaz-Leon 2015b;            
Jeffers 2013; Taylor 2000, see Appiah 1985 for criticism of race as a historical kind). Focusing on                 
social entities also reveals that some entities could have normative natures. For instance, being              
part of a social group might depend on being bound by particular social conventions or norms,                
perhaps as part of an overarching social structure (e.g., Ásta 2018; Thomasson forthcoming;             
Ritchie forthcoming). 
 
Social metaphysics also helps to show how normative considerations are relevant to theory             
choice. For example, feminist metaphysicians argue that metaphysical theories should not simply            
explain how big things are built from little ones, or how one event causes another. They also                 
ought to incorporate moral and political values (Barnes 2014, 2016, 2017; Haslanger 2012;             
12 
Haslanger and Ásta 2017; Mikkola 2015, 2017). That is, we should prefer theories that not only                
describe the world correctly, but can perform the relevant normative work. For example, an              
adequate theory of race and gender ought to enable us to accomplish our goal of eliminating                
racial and gender injustice and oppression. One motivation for an intersectional framework is that              
a single-axis analysis of oppression (e.g., an analysis focused just on sexism) can mask and               
reinforce oppression (Crenshaw 1989, 1991; Collins 2000; Spelman 1988). A focus on social             
entities allows one to see ways that descriptive and normative projects function in tandem.  
 
The inclusion of social metaphysics also has important diversifying effects. By excluding the             
investigation of social entities from metaphysics we thereby exclude the work of many             
philosophers who are women, transgender, non-binary, and people of color in an area of              
philosophy that is particularly white and male-dominated. 
 
Social entities not only have a place in metaphysical inquiry, they deserve a place of prominence.                
Just as feminist and critical race theory have encouraged philosophers of science and             
epistemologists to reconsider their starting assumptions, social metaphysics forces         
metaphysicians to reconsider the vantage points and inherent biases in certain metaphysical and             
theoretical predilections.  
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